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Abstract. Satoshi Nakamoto’s Blockchain allows to build publicly ver-
ifiable and almost immutable ledgers, but sometimes privacy has to be
factored in.
In this work an original protocol is presented that allows sensitive data
to be stored on a ledger where its integrity may be publicly verified, but
its privacy is preserved and owners can tightly manage the sharing of
their information with efficient revocation.
Keywords Privacy-Preserving Ledger, Blockchain, End to End Encryption, Sen-
sitive Data, Revocation, Consent, Cloud, Bilinear Groups.
1 Introduction
In the digital era information sharing is deeply embedded in practically every
process: it is difficult to achieve anything without having to share some per-
sonal data. Thankfully modern legislation (e.g. Europe’s GDPR) is catching up
with the privacy concerns that this kind of workflow fosters, and it is becoming
mandatory to allow users to manage how their data is shared. In particular the
right to be forgotten allows users to request the deletion of their data from one
service’s database, so they can revoke the consent to access and handle their
informations.
This also means that a platform that manages the sharing of personal data
must have an efficient revocation system that allows granular management of
users’ consent. Ideally users should be able to grant one-time access, that in
practice means limited in scope: access is granted as long as it is really needed
for the fulfilment of the service. This property essentially requires automatic
revocation. Should be noted that this approach follows the best practices of
need-to-know and principle of least privilege, especially when paired with end-
to-end encryption.
Public ledgers based on blockchains [13] are a great solution for storing pub-
lic information and they guarantee immutability and accountability. However
serious problems may arise when they are used to store sensitive data, such as
health records. In fact this kind of data is inherently private, but often needs to
be shared between multiple service providers (such as healthcare insurance com-
panies, hospitals, pharmacies), possibly with warranties that this data is legit
and not been tampered with.
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2Research on distributed storage has often focused on secure protocols, see
e.g. [7], however the advent of GDPR has started a quest for applications with
strong privacy properties suitable for sensitive data. For example there are in-
teresting works that exploit blockchain technologies to enhance access control
[1,15]. The work of Kosba et al. [10] provides a solution to the problem of keeping
a smart contract private. The work of Groth [9] shows how private data can be
encrypted and posted on a blockchain and later prove some properties about it.
We propose an original protocol that enables the construction of a public
ledger that securely and privately stores sensitive information with a blockchain
infrastructure. The intent is to allow secure sharing of this data between autho-
rized parties, integrating an end-to-end and one-time access system that provides
full control over the usage of private data, all while exploiting the accountability
and decentralisation of a blockchain, either pre-existing or purposely built.
1.1 Intuition
The work presented here is based on results included in the first author’s PhD
thesis [11].
The approach used to achieve a one-time access system is based on the fact that
when a party gains access to a cleartext, it has the opportunity to copy the data
and store it locally. If this is the case, it is worthless to negate further access to
that cleartext, since that party already owns a copy. However it is often expensive
to maintain a local copy of the data, so the goal becomes to avoid further access
to the data unless a local copy has been made. More precisely the aim is to
guarantee that no party has access to information with size smaller than the
entire cleartext, that can grant further access to the data (e.g. a key).
So the idea is to encrypt the cleartext with a sort of one-time-pad scheme,
in this way the key has at least the same size of the cleartext, so storing it does
not give any advantage over storing the cleartext directly. On the contrary, while
plaintext documents are usually reasonably compressible, cryptographic keys are
not, given their high entropy.
To achieve practicality the pad is stored encrypted on the ledger, so a smaller
key is sufficient to recover the original data. To maintain the one-time property
the pad is periodically re-encrypted so a new key is needed to access the data
again. The advantage over a classical storage re-encryption is that the protocol
combines a shared encrypted pad with individual per-file keys to generate the
actual encryption pad, so that it is sufficient to re-encrypt the shared pad to
effectively revoke access to all data. Thus the revocation is almost constant-
time, without affecting the privacy.
The scenario is the following: a private user U wants to store its private data
safely on the cloud, with the option to share that information with a service
provider P for some time, and with the guarantee that an independent third
party could audit the integrity of the data; this cloud is also called public ledger.
To coordinate the storage and in particular the revocation mechanism there is
3a file keeper F that is not properly a trusted third party since it is not respon-
sible for the confidentiality (but is in charge of a correct revocation), moreover
the party acting in this role could change at every revocation interval and its
behaviour can be publicly audited.
After the initialisation of the public ledger, U sets up its keys (public and
private) according to the parameters of the ledger. The ledger is divided in a
constant part where the encrypted data resides, available for sharing and public
auditing, and a variable part used to coordinate encryption, decryption and
revocation; F is in charge of updating and maintaining the variable portion of
the ledger. To optimise storage costs encrypted data could be actually stored
on a cheaper location suitable for remote access and sharing (such as a cloud or
distributed file system) and preserve on the public ledger only some metadata
used to publicly audit the integrity of the ciphertexts and the File Keeper’s
behaviour. Note that conventional blockchain ledgers are immutable (in the sense
of append-only write access), so the concept of a variable ledger may seem a
contradiction in terms. However we only require this portion of the ledger to
be publicly readable by all parties, while it is maintained (i.e. writeable) by F
only, so it is more akin to a traditional website and could easily be conceived
and deployed as a separate entity from the constant ledger.
To store information safely on the ledger, U needs an encryption token given
by F , that is used to synchronise with the updating part of the ledger. The token
is combined with the user’s private key, a session key, and additional parameters
available on the variable portion of the ledger, to encrypt U ’s personal data,
that is then safely stored on the constant part of the ledger alongside additional
information used to publicly audit the integrity of the data and the goodness of
F ’s behaviour in keeping the variable ledger. To offload key management from
the user the session key is encapsulated (i.e. safely masked) using U ’s private
key and stored in the variable part of the ledger.
To share data with the service provider P , the user U retrieves the relevant
encapsulated key, unlocks it using its own private key and shares it with P .
This unlocked key, combined with additional parameters available on the vari-
able ledger, can be used to successfully decrypt the data as stored on the static
part of the ledger. When the ledger is updated by F this key is automatically
revoked, because the decryption depends on the combination of this key with
the parameters of the variable ledger, that have changed with the update. As
aforementioned this means that with a single update every key is revoked, but
users can easily re-grant access to any document by unlocking the relevant en-
capsulated key (that has also been updated by F ).
Moreover since the data has not been re-encrypted in a conventional way, its
auditing is straightforward: it is a classic verification of static (immutable) data,
which is impossible to achieve with a conventional re-encryption.
The construction of the protocol is inspired from one-time-pad encryption,
public-key encryption schemes based on bilinear pairings, and the Diffie-Hellman
key exchange. The novelty of the approach resides in the modelling of the scenario
4of tightly-managed information sharing alongside its security requirements, and
the actual construction of the protocol, that carefully combines the underlying
primitives to achieve the desired properties. In particular to the best of our
knowledge this is the first construction with the one-time-access property and
fast revocation, combined with full support of public auditing.
2 Requirements and assumptions
This section covers background information necessary to understand the protocol
presented in this work and its security.
In particular, some mathematical notions about bilinear groups are given,
alongside the cryptographic assumptions that will be used.
2.1 Bilinear Maps
Pairing-based cryptography exploits the properties of bilinear pairings to add
new functionalities to encryption schemes that are difficult or impossible to
achieve with classical primitives. Bilinear groups are the main environment for
this type of cryptography. They are usually implemented with the group of
points of an elliptic curve over a finite field, while for the pairing the most com-
mon choices are the Tate and Weil pairings, in their modified version so that
e(g1, g2) 6= 1. For a detailed analysis of these groups, the curves to use in an
implementation, and bilinear pairings in general see [12,6]. The most used and
studied types of bilinear groups are the ones with prime order p.
Definition 1 (Pairing). Let G1,G2,GT be groups of the same prime order p.
A pairing is a bilinear map e such that e : G1 × G2 → GT has the following
properties:
– Bilinearity: ∀g ∈ G1, h ∈ G2,∀a, b ∈ Zp, e(ga, hb) = e(g, h)ab.
– Non-degeneracy: for g1, g2 generators of G1,G2 respectively, e(g1, g2) 6= 1GT .
Definition 2 (Bilinear Groups). G1,G2,GT are Bilinear Groups if the con-
ditions above hold and the group operations in G1,G2, and GT as well as the
bilinear map e are efficiently computable. GT is also called the target group.
In the remainder of this section G1,G2 and GT are understood.
Mapping of the target group In the protocol we use elements of the target
group GT as the source from which we derive the bitstrings that are xored with
the plaintext to encrypt it. The goal is to have a one-time-pad -like encryption,
therefore we need these bitstrings of length δ to be uniformly distributed in Fδ2
when they are derived from elements of GT chosen uniformly at random.
5Definition 3 (Uniform Mapping). Let GT be a target group of order p.A map
φ : GT → Fδ2 is a uniform mapping of GT of size δ if it is efficiently computable
and there is no probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm B : Fδ2 → {0, 1} has more
than negligible advantage:
AdvB =
∣∣∣Pr [B(φ(g)) = 1]− Pr [B(s) = 1] ∣∣∣ (1)
when g is chosen uniformly at random in GT and s is chosen uniformly at
random in Fδ2.
Depending on the group and its size, there could be encoding of its elements
that are actually uniformly distributed in the bitstring space, however in prac-
tical implementations a cryptographic hash function could be used as a suitable
uniform mapping.
2.2 Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Assumption
The Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) assumption is the basilar assump-
tion used for proofs of indistinguishability in pairing-based cryptography. It has
been first introduced in [3] by Boneh and Franklin in the case of symmetric pair-
ings (where G1 = G2) and then widely used in a variety of proofs, including the
one of the first concrete ABE scheme in [8]. Here we use a definition specific for
asymmetric pairings, introduced in [4]. We use an asymmetric pairing because
in practical implementations they guarantee the highest level of security for a
given computational cost (see e.g. [2,14,5])
Let α, β, γ, z ∈ Zp be chosen at random and g1, g2 be generators of the bi-
linear groups G1,G2 respectively. The decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH)
problem consists in constructing an algorithm
B(A = gα1 , B = gβ2 , C = gγ2 , T )→ {0, 1}
to efficiently distinguish between the tuples (A,B,C, e(g1, g2)
αβγ) and
(A,B,C, e(g1, g2)
z), outputting respectively 1 and 0. The advantage of B in
this case is clearly written as:
AdvB =
∣∣∣Pr [B(A,B,C, e(g1, g2)αβγ) = 1]− Pr [B(A,B,C, e(g1, g2)z) = 1] ∣∣∣
where the probability is taken over the random choice of the generators g1, g2,
of α, β, γ, z in Zp, and the random bits possibly consumed by B to compute the
response.
Definition 4 (BDH Assumption). The decisional BDH assumption holds if
no probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm B has a non-negligible advantage in
solving the decisional BDH problem.
62.3 Interactive Diffie-Hellman
Interactive assumptions are usually stronger than their static counterparts, since
the solver has more control over the parameters. This unfortunately means
that they give weaker security, but sometimes it is nearly impossible to reduce
highly interactive protocols to static assumptions, so interactive assumptions are
needed.
Interactive Decisional Diffie-Hellman Assumption Let C be a challenger
that chooses α, β, z ∈ Zp at random and g be a generator of a group G of prime
order p. The Interactive Decisional Diffie-Hellman (IBDDH) problem consists
in constructing an algorithm B(C)→ {0, 1} that interacts with the challenger in
the following way:
– C gives to B the values A = gα, B = gβ ;
– B chooses an exponent 0 6= s ∈ Zp and sends to the challenger the value
S = B
1
s ;
– C flips a random coin r ∈ {0, 1} and answers with Z = Sα = g αβs if r = 0,
Z = gz if r = 1;
– B, given A,B, S, Z, outputs a guess r′ of r.
The advantage of B in this case is clearly written as:
AdvB =
∣∣∣Pr [B(A,B, S, g αβs ) = 0]− Pr [B(A,B, S, gz) = 0] ∣∣∣
where the probability is taken over the random choice of the generator g, of
α, β, s, z in Zp, of r ∈ {0, 1}, and the random bits possibly consumed by B to
compute the response.
Definition 5 (IDDH Assumption). The Interactive Decisional DH assump-
tion holds if no probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm B has a non-negligible
advantage in solving the decisional IDDH problem.
Note that an adversary that can solve the IDDH problem can solve the DH
problem simulating a IDDH problem and choosing s = 1, but the converse is
not true since it is not possible to adapt the DH challenge without knowing s.
3 Protocol Specifications
Following the intuition given in Section 1.1 we present now the proposed con-
struction. We formally define the various actors and interactions that constitute
the protocol, and the data structure that we rely on. In the subsequent sec-
tion the security will be formally and rigorously assessed, modelling some attack
scenarios and proving their infeasibility.
73.1 Masking Shards Protocol
In this protocol multiple users Ul publish encrypted data on a public ledger
maintained by a file keeper F . To gain access to the encrypted data any service
provider P has to ask directly to the user for a decryption key to use in com-
bination with some masking shards that are published on the ledger. The file
keeper periodically updates the masking shards, so that older decryption keys
become useless.
The ledger also has a constant section where encrypted data is actually stored
and the integrity is guaranteed via chains of hash digests.
The construction of the scheme uses finite groups Zp whose size p depends
on a security parameter. Throughout the following definition it is assumed that
every exponent x ∈ Zp randomly generated is neither 1 nor 0.
Definition 6 (Updating Masking Shards Protocol). An Updating Mask-
ing Shards Protocol for a file keeper F , a set of users {Ul}1≤l≤N and a service
provider P proceeds along the following steps:
– F sets up the public ledger: bilinear groupsG1,G2 of prime order p are chosen
according to a security parameter κ, along with generators g1 ∈ G1, g2 ∈ G2.
Let e be the pairing and GT be the target group of the same order p, with
uniform mapping φ of size δ. F chooses uniformly at random exponents
ui ∈ Zp for 1 ≤ i ≤ I where I is the maximum number of shards in a data
block, determined from the desired data block length |B| by the formula
I = |B|/δ. Finally F chooses a random time-key st0 ∈ Zp and publishes the
initial masking shards:
εi,t0 = g
uist0
1 1 ≤ i ≤ I. (2)
F securely saves the value st0 but can forget the exponents ui.
– F periodically updates the shards choosing a new time-key stj+1 ∈ Zp and
computing
εi,tj+1 = (εi,tj )
stj+1
stj 1 ≤ i ≤ I. (3)
– Each user Ul chooses two private exponents µl, vl ∈ Zp, the first is immedi-
ately used to build and publish its public key:
ql = g
µl
2 . (4)
– To publish an encrypted file on the ledger at a time tj , a user Ul requests
an encryption token. F takes the public key ql of the user and computes:
kl,0,tj = q
1
stj
l (5)
= g
µl
stj
2 .
8– Let b − 1 be the index of the last block in the ledger, thus the file will be
published in the b-th block. Let mb be the message (file) that Ul wants to
encrypt, and Ibδ its length. Then Ul divides the message in pieces mb,i of
equal length δ, and chooses a random exponent kb ∈ Zp to compute the
encrypted shards as:
cb,i = mb,i ⊕ φ
(
e(εi,tj , (kl,0,tj )
kb)
)
1 ≤ i ≤ Ib (6)
= mb,i ⊕ φ
(
e(g
uistj
1 , g
kbµl
stj
2 )
)
= mb,i ⊕ φ
(
e(g1, g2)
uikbµl
)
.
If the message length is not a multiple of δ then it is sufficient to truncate
the last pad φ
(
e(g1, g2)
uIbkbµl
)
to match the length of the last piece mb,Ib ,
so that the final ciphertext cb = cb,1|| . . . ||cb,Ib has the lame length as the
plaintext mb.
– In addition to the encrypted shards, Ul computes the encapsulated key using
its second secret exponent:
kb,1,tj = (kl,0,tj )
vlkb
µl (7)
=
(
g
µl
stj
2
) vlkb
µl
= g
vlkb
stj
2 ,
Ul can forget the exponent kb once this key has been computed.
– Let i¯ ≡ b mod I. Then F computes the control shard:
cb = φ
(
e(εi¯,tj , kb,1,tj )
)
(8)
= φ
(
e(g
ui¯stj
1 , g
kbvl
stj
2 )
)
= φ
(
e(g1, g2)
ui¯kbvl
)
.
– Ul sends to F the digest h(mb) of the message through a secure hash function
h, the ciphertext cb, the control shard c
∗
b and the encapsulated key kb,1,tj .
F inserts into the next data block of the static public chain cb, h(mb), c
∗
b ;
and inserts in the updating ledger the encapsulated key kb,1,tj . At this point
the data block is completed with a hash-link to the previous block and an
integrity warranty that involves the hash digest of its contents (see Sec-
tion 3.2).
– Once that at least one file has been published, F has to periodically update
not only the masking shards but also the encapsulated keys. The key update
9is similar to the shard update:
kb,1,tj+1 = (kb,1,tj )
stj
stj+1 (9)
=
(
g
vlkb
stj
2
) stj
stj+1
= g
vlkb
stj+1
2 .
Where stj+1 ∈ Zp is the same time-key used to update the shards. Note that
stj could and should be forgotten once the update has been completed.
– Let P be a service provider that needs access to the file mb, and therefore
asks for permission to the owner of the file Ul. To grant a one-time permis-
sion (or better permission until the next update) Ul computes an unlocked
key valid for the current time tj . Ul retrieves from the updating ledger the
encapsulated key kb,1,tj and computes:
kb,2,tj = (kb,1,tj )
µl
vl (10)
=
(
g
vlkb
stj
2
)µl
vl
= g
µlkb
stj
2 .
– With the unlocked key P can decrypt the encrypted shards computing:
m′b,i = cb,i ⊕ φ
(
e(εi,tj , kb,2,tj )
)
1 ≤ i ≤ Ib (11)
= mb,i ⊕ φ
(
e(g1, g2)
uikbµl
)⊕ φ(e(guistj1 , g µlkbstj2 )
)
= mb,i ⊕ φ
(
e(g1, g2)
uikbµl
)⊕ φ (e(g1, g2)uiµlkb)
= mb,i.
Afterwards P can check the integrity of the decryption comparing the hash
digest of the decrypted message h(m′b) with the digest included in the b-th
block of the static chain.
3.2 Data Block structure
Encrypted data created by the users is collected and organized into data blocks.
The File Keeper maintains and publishes a variable portion of the ledger (it could
be conceptually separated from the static ledger, as discussed in Section 1.1) that
contains at any time t:
– the masked shards and their index:
(εi,t, i)1≤i≤I ; (12)
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– the encapsulated keys and the index of the data block where the correspond-
ing encrypted pieces are stored:
(kb,1,t, b)b≥1. (13)
All these elements are kept constantly updated.
The other part of the ledger is more akin to a classical blockchain and is
comprised of constant data blocks linked together. With “constant” we mean
that new data blocks may be added any time, but the old data blocks are never
changed. Each data block Bb contains:
– the ciphertext, the digests of the original cleartext, and the control shard:
Db = (cb, h(mb), c
∗
b); (14)
– the hash of the previous data block h(Bb−1);
Note that by design the index of the masking shard associated to the control
shard covers the whole range 1 ≤ i ≤ I. These pieces are needed to check the
integrity of the data stored in the updating part of the ledger (encapsulated keys
and masking shards). In fact let i¯ = b mod I, then for every time t it should
hold:
c∗b = φ
(
e(εi¯,t, kb,1,t)
)
(15)
= φ
(
e(g
ui¯st
1 , g
kbvl
st
2 )
)
= φ
(
e(g1, g2)
ui¯kbvl
)
.
Therefore any observer could check the coherence of the updating ledger (and
consequently the behaviour of the file keeper F ).
In alternative to the content defined in Equation (14), a more efficient blockchain
may be built excluding the actual encrypted data from the data blocks, retaining
only its digest. That is the bulk of data is stored in distributed databases, while
their hash is kept on the ledger to guarantee the integrity. This approach re-
duces consistently the size of the data blocks, that therefore can be more widely
distributed. This shrunk data block would therefore substitute Db as defined
in Equation (14) with:
D′b = (h(cb), h(mb), c
∗
b). (16)
The last thing required is a cryptographic warranty of immutability of the
static data blocks. If this protocol is combined with a pre-existing blockchain
then the latter may be exploited to guarantee data integrity: it is sufficient to
compute the digest:
db = h(h(Bb−1), Db), (17)
or d′b = h(h(Bb−1), D
′
b) with the shrunken variant, and simply embedding it
in a transaction registered on the aforementioned blockchain, effectively time-
stamping it (e.g. using OPRETURN in Bitcoin).
Alternatively, in absence of such an anchor, the warranty has to be included
in the static data blocks. Here we propose three different approaches, that are
to include either:
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. the signature of the user (owner of the data) on db;
. a proof of work involving db;
. a signature made by a third party (or a group or multi-party signature) on
db;
These solutions all have pros and cons to their adoption, the optimal choice is
probably a combination of the three.
The user signature would give proof of ownership of the data, on the other
hand without the signature the content remains fully anonymous to anyone
besides F , that can act as a proxy and forward the access request of P to the
relevant user Ul without disclosing its identity. To guarantee the end-to-end
property of the protocol P should have a public key known to (or retrievable
by) every user. So when F forwards a request by P to Ul, the user can encrypt
the unlocked key with this public key, so that only P can use it.
The proof of work would give increasingly stronger proof of integrity to older
data, in the sense that the more blocks are added to the ledger, the more infea-
sible it gets to manipulate older data maintaining the consistency of the chain.
The third party signature gives immediate proof of integrity of the block, in
alternative or addition to the proof of work. The trade-off between these solu-
tions is that a signature gives instantaneous integrity evidence but relies on the
honesty of the signer (possibly mitigated with multi-party signatures), whereas
a proof of work is more expensive and provides sufficiently reliable security only
for older blocks, but it does not rely on anyone’s honesty.
4 Security Model
The goals of the protocol is to achieve the following security properties:
End-to-end encryption The file keeper must not be able to read the plaintext
message at any time.
One-time access A service provider should be able to read a plaintext message
at the time t if and only if the file owner authorizes them with an unlocked
key for the time t.
4.1 Security against Outsiders and Service Providers
The security of the protocol is proven in terms of chosen-plaintext indistinguisha-
bility, the security game is formally defined as follows.
Definition 7 (Security Game). The security game for an updating masking
protocol proceeds as follows:
Init The adversary A chooses a number of users N that will encrypt files and
the maximum number of masking shards I.
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Setup For each user Ul, with 1 ≤ l ≤ N the challenger C sets up a public key ql,
and takes the role of the file keeper by publishing the initial masking shards
εi,t0 , for 1 ≤ i ≤ I.
Phase 0 The adversary may request updates of the masking shards εi,tj , for
1 ≤ i ≤ I, 0 ≤ j < n.
Commit The users commit to a key before creating a ciphertext by publishing
the encryption tokens kl,0,tn and the encapsulated keys kb,1,tn .
Phase 1 The adversary for each time n ≤ j < n∗ may request updates of the
encapsulated keys kb,1,tj , and either the corresponding unlocked keys kb,2,tj ,
or the masking shards εi,tj , but not both.
Challenge Let δ be the size of the uniform mapping φ of the target group GT .
For each 1 ≤ l ≤ N the adversary chooses two messages ml,0,ml,1 of length
Ilδ and sends them to the challenger, which flips a random coin rl ∈ {0, 1}
and publishes the encryption (cb,i, 1 ≤ i ≤ Il) of the message ml,rl .
Phase 2 Phase 1 is repeated for n∗ ≤ j < n′.
Guess The adversary chooses an l¯ such that 1 ≤ l¯ ≤ N and outputs a guess r′¯
l
of rl¯.
Definition 8 (Updating Masking Security). An Updating Masking protocol
with security parameter ξ is CPA secure if for all probabilistic polynomial-time
adversaries A, there exists a negligible function ψ such that:
Pr[r′¯l = rl¯] ≤
1
2
+ ψ(ξ) (18)
The scheme is proved secure under the BDH (Decisional Bilinear Diffie-
Hellman) assumption (Definition 4) in the security game defined above.
The security is provided by the following theorem.
Theorem 1. If an adversary can break the scheme, then a simulator can be
constructed to play the decisional BDH game with non-negligible advantage.
Proof. Suppose there exists a polynomial-time adversary A, that can attack the
scheme in the Selective-Set model with advantage . Then a simulator B can be
built that can play the Decisional BDH game with advantage /2. The simulation
proceeds as follows.
Init The adversary chooses the number of users N and the maximum number
of masking shards I, the simulator takes in a BDH challenge g1, g2, A = g
α
1 ,
B = gβ2 , C = g
γ
2 , T .
Setup The simulator chooses random µ′l, ωl, µl ∈ Zp for 1 ≤ l ≤ N , u′i ∈ Zp for
1 ≤ i ≤ I. Then it implicitly sets:
µl := µ
′
lβ vl :=
ωlβ
γ
1 ≤ l ≤ N, ui := u′iα 1 ≤ i ≤ I. (19)
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So it publishes the public keys of the users and the initial masking shards:
ql = B
µ′l 1 ≤ l ≤ N, εi,t0 = Au
′
ist0 1 ≤ i ≤ I (20)
= g
βµ′l
2 = g
αu′ist0
1
= gµl2 = g
uist0
1 .
Phase 0 In this phase the simulator answers to update queries of the masking
shards. For each time 0 ≤ j ≤ n it chooses uniformly at random stj ∈ Zp and
computes:
εi,tj = A
u′istj 1 ≤ i ≤ I (21)
= g
αu′istj
1
= g
uistj
1 .
Commit In this phase users commit to a key before creating a ciphertext, by
publishing their encryption tokens and encapsulated keys. Note that each user
may commit at a different time, but for simplicity we suppose that they commit
all together. Moreover from now on the indexes b and l will be identified, since
for the purposes of this proof only one encryption per user is considered.
To simulate the commitment B chooses uniformly at random k′l ∈ Zp and
implicitly sets kl := k
′
lγ for 1 ≤ l ≤ N . Furthermore it chooses stn ∈ Zp, then it
can compute:
kl,0,tn = B
µ′l
stn , kb,1,tn = B
ωlk
′
l
stn 1 ≤ l ≤ N (22)
= g
βµ′l
stn
2 = g
βωlγk
′
l
γstn
2
= g
µl
stn
2 = g
vlkl
stn
2 .
Phase 1 In this phase the adversary for each time n ≤ j < n∗ may request
updates of the encapsulated keys kb,1,tj , and either the corresponding unlocked
keys kb,2,tj , or the masking shards εi,tj , but not both. If the adversary asks for
the unlocked keys the simulator chooses at random s′tj ∈ Zp and implicitly sets
stj := s
′
tjβ. So it can compute:
kb,1,tj = g
ωlk
′
l
s′tj
2 , kb,2,tj = C
k′lµ
′
l
s′tj 1 ≤ l ≤ N (23)
= g
βωlγk
′
l
γβs′tj
2 = g
γk′lβµ
′
l
βs′tj
2
= g
vlkl
stj
2 = g
klµl
stj
2 .
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Otherwise, if the adversary asks for the masking shards, it chooses stj ∈ Zp and
computes
kb,1,tj = B
ωlk
′
l
stj 1 ≤ l ≤ N, εi,tj = Au
′
istj 1 ≤ i ≤ I (24)
= g
βωlγk
′
l
γstj
2 = g
αu′istj
1
= g
vlkl
stj
2 = g
uistj
1
Challenge For each 1 ≤ l ≤ N the adversary sends two messages ml,0,ml,1of
length Ilδ. The simulator flips N random coins rl ∈ {0, 1} then creates the
ciphertexts as:
cb,i := ml,rl,i ⊕ φ
(
Tu
′
ik
′
lµ
′
l
)
(25)
∗
= ml,rl,i ⊕ φ
(
e(g1, g2)
γk′lβµ
′
lαu
′
i
)
= ml,rl,i ⊕ φ
(
e(g1, g2)
klµlui
)
1 ≤ i ≤ Il, 1 ≤ l ≤ N
where the equality
∗
= holds if and only if the BDH challenge was a valid tuple
(i.e. T is non-random).
Phase 2 During this phase the simulator acts exactly as in Phase 1.
Guess The adversary will eventually select a user l¯ and output a guess r′¯
l
of rl¯.
The simulator then outputs 0 to guess that T = e(g1, g2)
αβγ if r′¯
l
= rl¯; otherwise,
it outputs 1 to indicate that it believes T is a random group element in GT . In
fact when T is not random the simulator B gives a perfect simulation so it holds:
Pr
[B (y, T = e(g1, g2)αβγ) = 0] = 1
2
+ 
On the contrary when T is a random element R ∈ GT , since φ is a uniform
mapping then the messages mrl are completely hidden from the adversary point
of view, so:
Pr [B (y, T = R) = 0] = 1
2
Therefore, B can play the decisional BDH game with non-negligible advantage 2 .
4.2 Security Against the File Keeper
In this section we describe the end to end privacy of the protocol testing its
robustness in scenarios where the File Keeper itself tries to read the content
of the encrypted data stored on the ledger. The security of the protocol will
again be proven in terms of chosen-plaintext indistinguishability, but there is a
distinction between two scenarios.
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In the first one the security will be proven using the standard Decisional
Bilinear Diffie Hellman Assumption, but we assume that the File Keeper is not
malicious and that it takes over the role after shards initialization. That is the
protocol is initialized and then the relevant information is passed to the File
Keeper that subsequently fulfils its role following the protocol (but trying to
decrypt the files).
In the second scenario the File Keeper independently sets up the masking
shards and freely interacts with the users, but in this case an interactive assump-
tion (Interactive Decisional Diffie-Hellman or IDDH) defined in 5 is necessary to
prove the security.
The security game of the first scenario is formally defined as follows.
Definition 9 (Curious File Keeper Security Game). The security game
for the protocol with a curious File Keeper proceeds as follows:
Init The adversary A chooses a number of users N that will encrypt files and
the maximum number of masking shards I.
Setup For each user Ul, with 1 ≤ l ≤ N the challenger C sets up a public key
ql, and initializes the masking shards εi,t0 , for 1 ≤ i ≤ I, giving also st0 to
A.
Commit A asks the users commit to a key before creating a ciphertext giv-
ing them encryption tokens kl,0,tj , C responds publishing encapsulated keys
kb,1,tj .
Challenge Let δ be the size of the uniform mapping φ ofGT . For each 1 ≤ l ≤ N
the adversary chooses two messages ml,0,ml,1 of length Ilδ and sends them
to the challenger that flips a random coin rl ∈ {0, 1} and publishes the
encryption (cb,i, 1 ≤ i ≤ Il) of the message ml,rl .
Guess The adversary chooses an l¯ such that 1 ≤ l¯ ≤ N and outputs a guess r′¯
l
of rl¯.
Definition 10 (Security with a Curious File Keeper). An Updating Mask-
ing protocol with security parameter ξ is CPA secure with a Curious File Keeper
if for all probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries A, there exists a negligible
function ψ such that:
Pr[r′¯l = rl¯] ≤
1
2
+ ψ(ξ) (26)
The security is provided by the following theorem.
Theorem 2. If an adversary can break the scheme, then a simulator can be
constructed to play the decisional BDH game with non-negligible advantage.
Proof. Suppose there exists a polynomial-time adversary A, that can attack the
scheme in the Selective-Set model with advantage . Then a simulator B can be
built that can play the Decisional BDH game with advantage /2. The simulation
proceeds as follows.
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Init The adversary chooses the number of users N and the maximum number of
masking shards I, the simulator takes in a DBDH challenge g1, g2,A = g
α
1 , B = g
β
2 ,
C = gγ2 , T .
Setup The simulator chooses random µ′l, ωl, µl ∈ Zp for 1 ≤ l ≤ N , u′i ∈ Zp for
1 ≤ i ≤ I, st0 ∈ Zp. Then it implicitly sets:
µl := µ
′
lβ vl :=
ωlβ
γ
1 ≤ l ≤ N, ui := u′iα 1 ≤ i ≤ I. (27)
So it publishes the public keys of the users and the initial masking shards:
ql = B
µ′l 1 ≤ l ≤ N, εi,t0 = Au
′
ist0 1 ≤ i ≤ I (28)
= g
βµ′l
2 = g
αu′ist0
1
= gµl2 = g
uist0
1 .
Moreover the exponent st0 is given to the adversary.
Commit In this phase the adversary asks the users to commit to a key before
creating a ciphertext, by giving them encryption tokens and obtaining encapsu-
lated keys in return. For every user l the adversary may choose a different time
tjl in which the commitment takes place. To formulate the query A chooses a
random exponent stjl and computes the encryption token:
kl,0,tjl = q
1
stjl
l (29)
= B
µ′l
stjl
= g
βµ′l
stjl
2
= g
µl
stjl
2 .
To simulate the answer B chooses uniformly at random k′l ∈ Zp and implicitly
sets kl := k
′
lγ for 1 ≤ l ≤ N . Then it can compute:
kb,1,tjl = (kl,0,tjl )
ωlk
′
l
µ′
l 1 ≤ l ≤ N (30)
= g
βµ′l
stjl
ωlk
′
lγ
µ′
l
γ
2
= g
β
γ ωl
γk′l
stjl
2
= g
vlkl
stjl
2 .
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Challenge For each 1 ≤ l ≤ N the adversary sends two messages ml,0,ml,1of
length Ilδ. The simulator flips N random coins rl ∈ {0, 1} then creates the
ciphertexts as:
cb,i := ml,rl,i ⊕ φ
(
Tu
′
ik
′
lµ
′
l
)
(31)
∗
= ml,rl,i ⊕ φ
(
e(g1, g2)
γk′lβµ
′
lαu
′
i
)
= ml,rl,i ⊕ φ
(
e(g1, g2)
klµlui
)
1 ≤ i ≤ Il, 1 ≤ l ≤ N.
Where the equality
∗
= holds if and only if the BDH challenge was a valid tuple
(i.e. T is non-random).
Guess The adversary will eventually select a user l¯ and output a guess r′¯
l
of rl¯.
The simulator then outputs 0 to guess that T = e(g1, g2)
αβγ if r′¯
l
= rl¯; otherwise,
it outputs 1 to indicate that it believes T is a random group element in G2. In
fact when T is not random the simulator B gives a perfect simulation so it holds:
Pr
[B (y, T = e(g1, g2)αβγ) = 0] = 1
2
+ 
On the contrary when T is a random element R ∈ GT , since φ is a uniform
mapping then the messages mrl are completely hidden from the adversary point
of view, so:
Pr [B (y, T = R) = 0] = 1
2
Therefore, B can play the decisional BDH game with non-negligible advantage 2 .
During the simulation in this proof the update of the masking shards and
encapsulated keys has not been explicitly considered because the adversary has
the role of the File Keeper, that is the party in charge of such operations, so the
simulator is not involved.
Note also that for the encryption in the challenge phase the simulator does
not use neither the masking shards nor the encapsulated key, so the update of
these elements is not strictly necessary (although the simulator should request
them even without using them just for the sake of a thorough simulation). This
is possible only because the simulator controls the initialization of the masking
shards, and this limits the possibilities for the attacker (e.g. choosing particular
values for st).
To consider a more powerful adversary and take account of possible interac-
tion the security game can be modified in this way:
– in the setup phase the simulator does not initialize the masking shards, the
adversary has complete control over them
– in the challenge phase the simulator asks for the updated version of the
masking shards and the encapsulated keys before computing the encryption,
moreover the adversary may ask that the encryptions take place at different
times.
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Now the security against this more powerful File Keeper can be given with
the following theorem.
Theorem 3. If an adversary taking the role of the file keeper can break the
scheme, then a simulator can be constructed to play the IDDH game in G2 with
non-negligible advantage.
Proof. The proofs is almost identical to the proof of Theorem 2, only the follow-
ing tweaks are necessary:
– the simulator starts initializing the IDDH challenge, obtaining the elements
A = gα2 , B = g
β
2 ;
– during the setup phase the simulator does not have to initialize the masking
shards so it does not need the element C and can therefore use A in the the
same way it used C in the previous simulations.
– during the challenge phase suppose that the adversary requests at time tj
the encryption of the user l, then the simulator asks the adversary for the
value of the updated masking shards εi,tj for 1 ≤ i ≤ I, and the updated
encapsulated key kb,1,tj . Then the simulator B interacts with the challenger
C of the IDDH game sending the value:
S = k
1
k′
b
ωl
b,1,tj
(32)
•
= (g
βωlk
′
b
stj )
1
k′
b
ωl
= g
β
stj
= B
1
stj .
C answers with Z and B proceeds with the encryption computing
cb,i := ml,rl,i ⊕ φ
(
e(εi,tj , Z
k′lµ
′
l)
)
(33)
•
= ml,rl,i ⊕ φ
(
e(g
uistj
1 , Z
k′lµ
′
l)
)
∗
= ml,rl,i ⊕ φ
(
e
(
g
uistj
1 , (g
αβ
stj
2 )
k′lµ
′
l
))
= ml,rl,i ⊕ φ
(
e(g1, g2)
uiαk
′
lβµ
′
l
)
= ml,rl,i ⊕ φ
(
e(g1, g2)
uiklµl
)
1 ≤ i ≤ Il
Where the equality
∗
= holds if and only if in the IDDH challenge the value
of the random coin tossed by C is r = 0. Note that the equalities •= hold if
and only if the adversary followed the protocol acting as the File Keeper,
however the interaction with C is valid even if this is not the case, and
from the prospective of A the simulation has the same distribution of an
interaction with the real protocol.
The rest of the simulation is identical and the same considerations hold, thus B
has an advantage of 2 playing the IDDH.
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4.3 Security against other Users
In the previous sections the robustness of the protocol against outside attackers
and even against the file keeper has been proven. To complete the analysis we
present now some considerations about the remaining party that participates in
the protocol: the users.
Consider a setting in which the attacker interacts with the protocol as a
normal user (thus requests encryption tokens, publishes encapsulated keys and
ciphertexts), but then tries to distinguish the encryption of plaintexts of their
choice performed by other users. Starting from the security game of Definition 7,
phases 1 and 2 can be modified removing unlocked key queries but adding queries
for encryption tokens given a public key. Once the adversary has given the chal-
lenger an encapsulated key, the update of these keys may be requested, just like
any other key. In this way we model a (possibly malicious) user, that interacts
with the file keeper and can observe the chain and its evolution.
This model leads to the same conclusion on the security of the system. Since
the system is secure against the file keeper, and a user knows less than the file
keeper, then the security holds also against other users.
The proof of the security in this scenario follows directly from the proof of
Theorem 1, in fact without the need of simulating unlocked keys the simulator
can always choose st freely, and thus can follow slavishly the protocol when the
adversary requests encryption tokens and updates of the related keys.
5 Conclusion and comments
The protocol presented here expands the scope of distributed ledgers, and in
particular blockchain-like designs, to include the safe storage of sensitive data.
The approach used to achieve the one-time access property aims at a highly
efficient revocation. That is, the concept of masking shards is used to revoke the
access to every ciphertext updating only common elements. This means that it
is not necessary to update every block, but only the shards and the encapsu-
lated keys, that are very much shorter than the actual data, thus achieving great
efficiency gains in comparison with re-encryption approaches. Furthermore this
allows to check the integrity of the ciphertexts even before decryption, and any
observer can monitor the integrity of the ledger checking the coherence of the
hash digests in the static chain and verifying the control shards against the data
contained in the updating section.
As outlined in Section 1.1 the one-time access property also relies in the
impossibility for a service provider P to save a key smaller than the actual
data that guarantees access beyond revocation, and we noted how in practice
data may be compressed, while cryptographic keys may not. In light of these
observation one may improve the efficiency of the protocol expanding the length
of the pads so that fewer shards (and therefore fewer pairing computations) are
required for encryption and decryption, in a sense compensating for the different
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compressibility of data and keys. When customising these parameter one shall
consider that the key material necessary for decryption has (almost exactly) the
same length of the plaintext when the size δ of the uniform mapping is the same
as the length of an optimal encoding of an element of G1, since the masking
shards are elements of this group.
Given the proofs of security against a curious file keeper, it follows that this
role is only busy updating shards and encapsulated keys, but it is not depositary
of trust in a privacy sense. To further reduce the dependence on the file keeper,
the protocol can be modified in order to employ temporary file keepers, that are
only responsible to perform one update. The passage of responsibilities can be
done in multiple ways, e.g. choosing a random candidate in a given set, or voting
the preferred successor. In any case the current F chooses a random st, while
the exponent st−1 is obtained from the previous file keeper in a safe and secure
way; once the update has been completed and a successor has been nominated
F passes on st. Note that this method enforces the oblivion of old exponents,
preventing previous file keepers to reverse a revocation.
A final remark regards the frequency of revocation. As presented here the
protocol revokes every ciphertext at once, and while this might be convenient
in terms of revocation efficiency, not every application suits this approach, in
particular when it is not feasible to burden the user with frequent unlocking of
encapsulated keys to restore access to revoked files. An easy solution is to employ
different sets of encryption shards, and divide the updating section of the ledger
according to different frequencies of revocation. For example a practical ledger
could have a set of shards updated with medium frequency, suitable for most of
the regular files, a set reserved for quick revocation of very sensitive files, and
finally a set for long term accesses, that is updated only in case of necessity.
In conclusion the protocol presented here demonstrates a practical construc-
tion of a scheme that allows tightly-managed sharing of sensitive information
with one-time-access property and fast revocation, combined with full support
of public auditing. These properties makes it a perfect candidate for a cloud
solution that aims to safely operate with sensitive data cooperating with mul-
tiple service providers (for example health records that have to be shared with
insurance companies, medical professionals, hospitals, etc.), also considering the
requirements of modern privacy legislation such as GDPR.
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